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ABSTRACT
By January of 1992, Space Station Freedom was rapidly
approach critical design review. In March of 1993, in light
of past NASA debacles and in the interest of decreasing the
deficit, the new administration asked NASA to redesign the
space station. The redesign produced three less expensive
options, which were, however, almost immediately discarded
as a result of Russian interest in joining the program. Thejoint U.S.-Russian space station, called Space Station
Alpha, has since then itself undergone a number of
incarnations.
This thesis attempts to track the different conceptions of
the space station through the redesign process and its
aftermath. The technical differences among the three
options and Station Alpha are discussed. The selection of
the design was based on a combination of political and
technical advantages, although the technical changes were,
in the final analysis, primarily cosmetic. The addition of
Russian elements to the program arose entirely from
political interests, and its led to extensive tampering with
the existing design, which was not well enough thought
through. The space station, in its current design, has many
flaws, which can be traced to the lack of understanding of
the specifications and requirements of the program.
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Introduction
The period following the election and inauguration of
President Clinton was one of confusion for NASA. The
administration was conspicuously silent on its intent for
the space program, while asserting its intent to attack the
budget deficit by attacking government spending. This led
many to wonder whether the new Democratic administration
would be less willing than its Republican predecessors to
support large NASA programs. To all of this was added the
general popular opinion, with the Hubble debacle firmly in
mind, that all NASA projects have cost and schedule overruns
and will break before they can be useful. The future of
NASA was, to put it mildly, uncertain.
Into this political and fiscal confusion came the space
station. Space Station Freedom (SSF) was the largest, most
ambitious, and, consequently, most expensive of the projects
that were being undertaken at the time by NASA. It was
rapidly approaching its critical design review. Accusations
that the space station program was pork-ridden and contained
many hidden costs made it the natural place for the budget
cuts NASA was given to expect to begin. This event was made
only more likely by the general uncertainty as to the
purpose of such a space station, with the Space Exploration
Initiative, to all appearances, eliminated and the value of
any valuable scientific research, according to the space
science community, marginal at best. The prospects of SSF
were not promising.
In addition, it was increasingly apparent that SSF was
an ailing program. There were many fiscal and scheduling
problems that were still unresolved. Many space station
system designs had cost and development schedule overruns.
The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM), which was required
to launch the Japanese contribution to the station, was also
behind in development. These difficulties were rendered
more critical by the recognition that the development
schedules had inadequate margins allocated. Operational
costs, such as the purchase of replacement parts and
installation of system upgrades, had not been funded. In
addition, there were several technical considerations that
had not been addressed, including the lack of an Assured
Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) and the failure of the baseline
station to meet the program orbital debris requirements.
Finally, it was obvious that the management structure for
SSF was confused and unworkable.
In recognition of the political and fiscal pressures
that were apparent in the early stages of the Clinton
presidency, the administration proposed that the SSF program
be reexamined in an attempt to reduce costs. To this end
the Station Redesign Team was formed. It consisted of 45
NASA employees along with representatives of the
international partners in the program. Begun on March 10,
1993, the redesign effort was to last 90 days. Soon
afterwards, the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the
Space Station was formed in order to submit recommendations
based on the several options the Redesign Team was to
propose.
As a starting point for the redesign effort, the
administration stated what it considered to be the benefits
of a space station that justified its existence. The
primary purpose of the station was to be space science
research, primarily in material and life sciences. This is
a slight change from the original purpose, where the station
was, as much as anything else, to be built as a stepping
stone for future manned exploration, although the primary
activity on board was to be research. The station was also
to exhibit international cooperation in advanced technology,
with the intent of helping to solidify the new diplomatic
situation in the post-Cold War political arena. The
redesign team was instructed specifically to consider
proposals that included Russian participation. Finally, the
space station program was to contribute to the revival of
the struggling U.S. economy. In the short term, it was to
accomplish this through direct stimulation of the aerospace
industry from government spending. In the long run, the
station was to encourage new users to beccme involved in
space research and, hopefully, to discover new and
profitable ways of exploiting the space environment and
provide valuable fallout to the civil economy'.
The redesign effort was to reconfigure the space
station in such a way that initial on-orbit research would
occur by 1997, with assembly complete by 1998. The
specifications for the station were to remain largely
unchanged, although the targeted lifetime for the program
was decreased drastically (from thirty years to ten). The
interfaces with the international partners especially were
to be unaltered in the new configuration. The charter
required the reduction of the extravehicular activity (EVA)
necessary for assembly and the implementation of a simpler
and more efficient management structure. And, of course,
the primary focus of the redesign effort was the reduction
of the cost of the SSF program. The cost levels that the
administration proposed were 5, 7, and 9 billion dollars
through the five year period in which the station was to be
assembled. The redesign team addressed three different
options in their attempt to satisfy these requirements;
these were Modular Buildup (Option A), Space Station Freedom
'Goldin, Daniel. Memo to NASA Headquarters Directors. Subject: Redesign Process.
Derived (Option B), and Single Launch Core Vehicle (Option
C). These options will be discussed in later sections.
Design Drivers
There were a number of issues that were important
design drivers for all three options. The most obvious and
important of these was, of course, the cost. The need to
reduce costs, both developmental and operational, was at the
root of nearly every design change made by the redesign
team. The costing issue was very complicated and will be
handled separately in a later section.
Another overarching design issue was the inclination of
the orbit of the space station. SSF had been baselined for
a 28.8 degree inclination orbit, but there are many benefits
to a higher inclination orbit. First, it improves the
availability of launches. At a higher inclination orbit
(greater than 40 degrees), the space station could be
reached by the Russian man-rated launch system, the
Proton/Soyuz, in addition to by the Space Shuttle. In this
scenario, the Soyuz would be the ACRV for SSF and would, in
fact, be launched on a Proton rather than the Shuttle.
Also, the Russian Proton and the European Ariane could be
used as backups for unmanned launches. This alternate
launch capability provides much greater confidence in our
ability to maintain a flight schedule in the operational
phase.
The increased inclination also provides a greater
degree of flexibility in the case of an emergency. Both
ACRVs considered by the redesign team, the Soyuz and the
Space Shuttle, require a land-based landing. Since the
Shuttle has limited aerodynamic control and the Soyuz almost
none, the latitude range of possible landing sites are
effectively limited by the orbital inclination when the
deorbiting boost occurs. It turns out that, while the
latitude range available at the 28.8 degree inclination is
almost entirely ocean, the higher latitude (51.6 degrees)
provides a number of convenient landing sites. This
results in much improved likelihood of survival of
catastrophic damage.
Another minor side effect of the higher inclination
orbit is slightly increased power production. The higher
inclination orbit have less eclipse time per orbit. This
results in longer periods of power production and,
therefore, more power produced per orbit (on the order of 4-
6 kW). This effect also increases the lifetime of the
batteries slightly.
Finally, the higher inclination orbit, for the same
reason it results in more landing sites for the ACRV, allows
a greater range of earth observation. With the Mission to
Planet Earth missions receiving the most interest from the
vice-president, the increased global coverage would allow
for some interesting possibilities for earth science
research on the station that would be unavailable at lower
inclinations. Some common systems from the Earth Observing
System (EOS), for example, might be placed on the station,
allowing the EOS satellites to be smaller, and,
consequently, less expensive. As a number of experiments
already planned for SSF require that the station orbit in
local vertical, local horizontal (LVLH) mode, it would
already be orbiting in an orientation appropriate for earth
observation.
The higher inclination is, of course, not without its
cost. It decreases the mass that the Shuttle can boost into
orbit significantly. This mass limitation increases the
number of assembly flights required, as well as
necessitating the ASRM program and the production of the
aluminum-lithium (Al-Li) tank. The increased inclination
also changes the radiation environment of the station as
well.
Another design driver was the required power allocation
to the users. 30 kW are to be provided for experiments
(with the International Partners on board). In many cases,
the design alterations that were made to decrease costs had
adverse effects on the power production. This became a
thorny issue, especially in the case of Option C, and it is
unclear that the redesign team ever found the optimum
balance. Other technical drivers were mass and volume
(limited by the assumption of Shuttle launches), the
requirement of decreased EVA, and the necessity of keeping
the interfaces with the international units stable. The
interaction of these issues and other option specific design
drivers will be examined more fully in later sections. The
political pressures, from the administration, the Congress,
and the international partners, were also major, if not the
most important, design drivers, but these considerations are
will not be dealt with in any depth in this discussion .
These and other design drivers are discussed in greater detail in the "Final Report to the Advisory
Committee on the Redesign of the Space Station," 7-15.
Freedom Derived Options
Options A and B are both predominantly derived with few
changes from the baseline Freedom design. The
specifications of the redesign committee required Option B
to maximize the use of existing designs, but Option A was
not in this way limited' . Option A was specified to be a
modular approach to fulfilling the same requirements as the
baseline station, but, given that the requirements were the
same, it is unsurprising that the two options were, in the
end, extremely similar to each other and the original
proposal. Since the similarities are so pronounced, both
options will be dealt with in this chapter.
Baseline Design
The fundamental mission of the baseline station is the
establishment of an orbiting research facility with lifetime
of at least 30 years (now shortened to 10) with two
crewmembers dedicated to scientific activity. In support of
the two crewmembers dedicated to research are two others
whose purpose is to take care of the operational
requirements. The number of crew members can be increased
to a total of 8 through the addition of another habitation
module.
The station design calls for a set of laboratory and
one habitation module joined by various nodes and all
attached to a connected series of truss segments. The
complete truss is 355 feet long. 56.25 kW of electrical
power, with 30 kW allocated to the users (with the
international modules present), are produced by three
photovoltaic arrays, with two arrays on the starboard side
2 Shea, Joseph F.. Conversations with the author.
of the truss. A fourth array may be added on the port side
truss to boost the power output to 75 kW if required. The
solar arrays are fitted with both alpha and beta joints to
allow for increasing sun tracking capabilities, maximizing
power production and improving the stability of the power
profile throughout the year.
Space Station Freedom is to be placed at an altitude of
220 nautical miles with an orbital inclination of 28.8
degrees. The guidance, navigation, and control system
performs orbital maintenance, as well as maintaining the
attitude of the station in local vertical, local horizontal
mode at all times. The GNC system consists of four control
moment gyros and four magnetic dampers, two star trackers,
and three inertial sensors.
The station allocated 44 m to all users in the form of
45.5 International Standard Payload Racks. The active
equipment in the modules, the subsystem equipment as well as
that designated for research, is to be stored in such
International Standard Payload Racks. Among the facilities
included in the design are a centrifuge, a furnace, and a
refrigerator/freezer. The microgravity levels in these
regions are constrained to meet certain frequency dependent
requirements3 . The various modules and nodes are capable
of maintaining normal living conditions for four crewmembers
over the required lifetime.
Space station freedom utilizes both active and passive
thermal controls to manage heat regulation and rejection.
The passive thermal control elements consists of thermal
coatings to enhance heat absorption or heat loss,
insulation, and heaters. Heat rejection from the station is
accomplished through five external radiators, three
SSpace Station Redesign Team. "Presentation to the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space
Station," Apr 22, 1993, 17.
designated for the solar arrays plus one for each side of
the truss.
The active thermal control system is divided into the
internal, external, and photovoltaic control systems. The
photovoltaic active thermal control system consists of four
single phase loops with ammonia as the thermal medium that
could reject an 8.4 kW of heat, averaged over the orbit.
The external active thermal control system consists of three
two-stage ammonia loops which can reject about 96 kW of heat
in the completed configuration. The internal active thermal
control system consists of two single phase water loops.
Transportation, for both crew transfer and operational
and assembly flights, is dependent on the Space Shuttle. 18
(23)* flights are required for the completion of assembly,
and the space station will require two operations flights
per year. The baseline design does require the Al-Li tanks
for assembly, but the ASRM boosters are not necessary,
except for the ESA and JEM contributions. Two Shuttle
orbiters may be docked at the space station at one time.
The baseline station does not provide for ACRVs.
The baseline station, according to the redesign team
estimates4 , would cost 14.4 billion dollars through fiscal
year (FY) 1998, with another 5.6 billion dollars required
for completion. Permanent human capability would be
achieved in September, 2000.
Option B
The purpose of Option B was to determine what
alterations could be made in the baseline design to decrease
Throughout this analysis, the number of flights stated to reach a milestone will, unless otherwise stated,
will be given for an orbit with 28.8 degrees inclination, with the number required for 51.6 degrees
inclination following in parentheses.
4 Space Station Redesign Team. "Final Report to the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space
Station," Jun 7, 1993.
the cost. This design was expected to resemble the baseline
strongly. The Option B team realized early on in the design
process that, without much more significant changes in the
requirements, cost savings would not be achieved through
hardware changes alone.' The cost benefits in this option
derive almost entirely from a restructured management plan,
simplified software and infrastructure for data management,
and some improvements in early operation and utilization
costs. 6  The final design is shown in Figure 1.
Description
The subsystems, as was expected, remained predominantly
unchanged from the baseline. The electrical power system
(EPS), the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) system,
propulsion, and the robotics for Option B were all exactly
the same as in the original Freedom design. The
environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) and
the communication and tracking system both underwent very
minor alterations. Only the data management system (DMS)
was changed significantly from the baseline design. Even
for DMS, the hardware changes were largely peripheral, with
most of the cost and power savings deriving from the
proposed simplifications in the software and user support.7
This is not to say that more profound deviations from
the baseline were not considered. As of the April 12
report, four other configurations were being considered.8
One of these alternate configurations was designated the
"Quick Lab." This option combined two of the truss segments
(the M1 and S1 truss elements) and launched the lab before
5 Space Station Redesign Team. "Report to the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space
Station," Apr 22, 1993.
6 Ibid.
7 Space Station Redesign Team. "Final Report to the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space
Station." 16. Except where otherwise noted, the description of the three options is based on this report.8 Priest, Pete, et. al. "Option A Modular Buildup Concept, Option Lead Status Report," Apr 13, 1993.
Figure 1. Option B - Permanent Human CapaDility
the node or habitation module. This would allow human-
tended capability (HTC) after only five flights. This
design was conceived as a possible stopping point in the
assembly of the station at which some research was possible.
With additional assembly flights this design would evolve
into one of the other options. This option was eventually
rejected because the required redesigns would increase the
cost.
The other three configurations considered by the Option
B team were designated Option 2, Option 2A, and Option 4.
All of these options eliminated the habitation module,
distributing its functions throughout the lab modules and
nodes. All three options differed from the baseline station
in that various truss elements were eliminated. Option 2A
eliminated the port-side truss elements (P1 and P2), keeping
two solar arrays on the starboard truss. This configuration
would be much simpler than the baseline, in that it would
have only one alpha joint and one truss segment. HTC would
9 Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space Station. Final Report to the President, 23.
be achieved at an inclination of 51.6 degrees in only 9
assembly flights, and permanent human capability (PHC) in
21. This option had a number of problems associated with
it, including lack of redundancy in critical areas, array
shadowing, poor microgravity resulting from the asymmetric
design, and limited thermal rejection capabilities due to
the absence of the S1 truss segment.
Options 2 and 4 both have a "symmetric" design, in that
there are solar array assemblies on both sides of the truss.
Option 2 eliminates the S1 and P2 truss elements, while
Option 4 eliminates only the P2 element. In both these
cases, the redesign team determined that the additional
redundancy and expandability associated with the complete
truss validated the extra cost and complexity.
While the alternatives described above did not, in
fact, become part of the final form of Option B, their
influence can be seen in the modular structure of the final
design. It is not surprising that the Option B team, unable
to meet the cost target for FY 94-98 of nine billion dollars
and recognizing the unstable funding environment large NASA
programs find themselves in from year to year, opted for a
modular approach to the station assembly, similar to the one
which will be discussed under Option A.
The Option B assembly plan has five major stopping
points. Initial Research Capability (IRC) is achieved in
only 2 (3) assembly flights. The "Power Station," as the
resulting system is referred to, consists of the starboard
truss elements with one photovoltaic array. The Power
Station is equipped with S-band communications, complete
attitude control, and an active thermal control system. The
Power Station provides 13.5 kW to an attached Shuttle
orbiter. The purpose of the Power Station is to provide
power and an improved microgravity environment to an
attached Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) equipped with a
Spacelab research facility. The similarity between the
Power Station and the "Quick Lab" discussed above should be
clear.
The next milestone occurs after flight 8 (10) and is
designated Human-Tended Capability (HTC or MTC). The US
Laboratory Module is already deployed at this point,
providing 13 International Standard Payload Racks in a
microgravity environment of less than 2 mg.* 11 kW out of a
total 18.75 kW are allocated to the users. The MTC
configuration allows for research activity without an
orbiter attached but does provide accommodation for docking
of two orbiters at once. The Canadian mobile service
station is also present and provides for robotic maintenance
of the space station. The station can at this point be
maintained indefinitely with periodic Space Shuttle support
flights.
The next stage in the station assembly is International
Human Tended Capability (IHTC). This occurs after 17 (21)
assembly flights. At this stage, the station is two fault
tolerant for station survival. By this point, the
International modules, as well as the port-side truss
elements, have been added, but these laboratories are not
yet outfitted with payload racks or equipment. These
require additional flights.
The full power production of 56.25 kW (30 kW for users)
is now provided, with all three photovoltaic assemblies.
The third solar array assembly is on the port side of the
truss. This change from the baseline design was implemented
to improve the microgravity environment by moving the center
of mass closer to the laboratory modules. All of the
laboratory modules are in place, and each is maintained with
less than 1 mg of acceleration . The P2 truss segment has
been deleted. The deletion of this truss element is a
leftover from the Option 4 design discussed above.
By flight 20 (25), the station is complete" . This
stage is designated Permanent Human Capability (PHC). The
ACRVs and the US Habitation Module have been added. This
assembly sequence assumes Space Shuttle capabilities without
the Al-Li tank or the ASRM. The availability of these
improvements would, of course, decrease the number of
flights and provide for earlier completion of the assembly.
Similar to the baseline station, Option B may be
expanded with the addition of another habitation module and
port-side solar array to allow for 8 crew members and to
provide 75 kW. Because of the larger truss length, Option B
provides for the greatest expandability of all the options.
Also, due to the advanced stage of the design, Option B has
the lowest programmatic risk and provides for the best use
of the 8.5 billion dollars already spent on the space
station.
Evaluation
The Option B design contains only minor changes from
the baseline station. The design is mature, but still
extremely complex. It is the most expensive of the options
and has the highest risk associated with it, due to the
number of launches and the large amount of EVA it requires.
It also has the additional disadvantage of being perceived
as exactly the same as the baseline design, in which case
All microgravity levels cited here are taken from the analyses contained in the Redesign Team reports,
which are steady-state accelerations. They do not include estimates of periodic variations in the
microgravity environment, caused by human and instrumental disturbances or other transitory
accelerations.
*The number of assembly flights required for complete assembly differs from that stated for the baseline
station only because of the inclusion of two flights to place the two Soyuz modules in orbit to act as
ACRVs
the entire redesign process appears to be a waste of time
and money. This was politically unacceptable. In light of
these problems, it is hardly surprising that Option B was
rejected in favor of the other two options by the Blue
Ribbon Panel.
Option A
Option A was very similar to Option B and to the
baseline station, in that it is a modular design based on
the baseline, but it was allowed more freedom in altering
the hardware. The design that resulted is a slightly
simplified version of the baseline, with little decrease in
capability. The similarity to Option A is easily seen in
Figure 2.
The most significant hardware alteration lies in the
conception of a "core module." In the baseline design, as
has previously been discussed, a combination of pressurized
modules and nodes is used. In this option, core modules,
which combine one node and one module into a single unit,
are the building block for the station.
The core module has one third less volume than that of
a baseline module (e.g. the U.S. laboratory module)
available for payload. This decrease results from the
inclusion of four berthing ports, to replace the function of
the nodes. These are used for ACRVs, airlocks, etc. The
redesign team claims that this decrease in effective volume
can be accommodated by the combination of "phased
requirements definition...,subsystems simplification..., and
elimination of equipment duplicated in the Space Station
Freedom modules and nodes."'" This point will be further
discussed below.
'0 Space Station Redesign Team, Final Report to the Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the Space
Station, Opt A rpt, 5-6.
Figure 2. Option A - Permanent Human Capability"L
Another point that differentiates this option from
Option B is the consideration of the use of an existing
satellite, the Lockheed Bus-i spacecraft, to perform
propulsion, GNC, and some data management functions. This
version of the design is designated Option A-i. The other
version, in which baseline Freedom subsystems are used for
these functions is called Option A-2.
The Bus-i Spacecraft
The Lockheed Bus-i is a semi-classified reconnaissance/
surveillance satellite. The Bus-i spacecraft contains 11660
lbs of N204 and MMH propellants. The propellant is stored
in six tanks. It had six small thrusters and one large
engine for reboost. Currently, no method for on-orbit
refueling has been determined to be practical; the only
method available is to refuel on the ground. Research into
on-orbit refueling of Bus-i is underway.
"Advisory Conmittee on the Redesign of the Space Station, Final Report to the President, 22.
/*I *\
Bus-i determines attitude through a combination of nine
rate gyros, two magnetometers, and an assortment of sun and
star sensors. Attitude is controlled by six single axis
control moment gyroscopes, in addition to the twelve
reaction control thrusters. There is currently some
question regarding the ability of Bus-i to control the space
station sufficiently. This research is also ongoing.
There are some modifications to the Bus-i that are
necessary for its utilization onboard the Space Station.
The reaction control thrusters and the satellite's solar
array must be relocated. Some systems, such as an
electrical converter, power/data grapple fixtures, and
communications interfaces, must be added. In addition, a
mechanical interface that will allow the spacecraft to
determine the center of gravity of the Space Station is also
required. Even so, the Bus-i spacecraft cannot be
configured for on-orbit maintenance.
The use of the Bus-i drives many substantial
differences between Options A-i and A-2. It is obvious that
the propulsion, GNC, and data management systems will be
different, as these are the functions that the Bus-i is
intended to fill. Other changes, however, result from the
use of this satellite. One example is that a transition
section, connecting the Bus-i to the previously designed
truss, must be built for Option A-i. Also, the replacement
of a substantial amount of hardware by the Bus-i allows for
the elimination of a greater number of truss segments, five
for Option A-i compared to only three for Option A-2. This
translates to a further 36 ft decrease in the end-to-end
length of the Space Station. In addition, the optimized
flight modes for the two options differ by a 90 degree in-
orbit rotation.
Description
Both Options A-1 and A-2 attempt to simplify the
subsystems that were to be used on the baseline station. In
both designs, for example, the alpha joints on the solar
arrays are deleted. The beta joints, however, are
maintained, allowing for some adjustments to adverse solar
angles. In addition to the capability of the beta joint,
another adjustment to solar angle is made through varying
the flight mode. The station varies its flight mode to
decrease cosine losses, half of the time flying with solar
arrays in the orbital plane, the other half with them
perpendicular to it. This increases the power generated
slightly without seriously impinging on earth observation
activity.
The central thermal control system is a single-phase
ammonia system, with redundant radiators and pumps. This
system is similar to the system already baselined for the
thermal control of the photovoltaic system. This system is
much simpler than the dual-phase ammonia system that was in
the baseline design. This alteration also has the advantage
of avoiding the necessity of two separate designs for
thermal control, simplifying the design process and
decreasing the cost. The remaining elements of the thermal
control system are identical to those in the baseline.
The life support systems (ECLSS) are also simplified,
partly due to the use of the common module. Where separate
life support equipment for two different pressurized
structures, a module and a node, had been necessary, now
only one system is required. This elimination of redundant
equipment, as well as the deletion of the U.S. pressurize
logistics module, allow for some hardware based cost
savings. Further savings are realized through the
simplification of the data management system, by removing
the fiberoptic elements, simplifying the software and the
verification procedure, and replacing terminals with laptop
computers.
The assembly manifests for the two options are almost
identical, with only minor differences that occur in the
first few flights. In both cases, the Power Station is
achieved in 3 flights and HTC in 4. IHTC occurs after 9
flights, and assembly is complete after 13. The assembly
sequence is exactly the same for a 51.6 degree inclination
orbit, although the Soyuz ACRVs are delivered in this case
by the Russian Proton launch system rather than the Shuttle.
This sequence, however, assumes the availability of the Al-
Li external tank for the Space Shuttle and requires some
assembly at low altitudes, since the orbiter has an
effective 175 nmi ceiling at this inclination. This
necessitates additional propellant expenditure for reboost
to 230 nmi altitude.
Issues
There are several issues regarding Option A that remain
to be resolved. Some of the ones pertinent only to Option
A-i were mentioned above: the controllability of the station
and the refueling and maintenance of the Bus-i on-orbit.
Another point that has been mentioned is the necessity of
the Al-Li tank for high inclination. This requirement is
not particularly damaging to the option's prospects, as it
is necessary for high inclination for all the options, but
the reboost requirements from low altitude assembly are
costly. One final concern relevant only to Option A-i is
the possibility of difficulty in docking the orbiter with
the solar arrays parallel to the final orbiter approach.
This problem is easily remedied by flying in the same mode
as in Option A-2 (rotated 90 degrees in the orbital plane),
with only a slight penalty in performance.
Related to the docking issue is the possibility of
unacceptable plume loading on the solar arrays. The
decreased truss length brings the solar arrays in closer to
where the Shuttle plumes are discharged. This could lead to
an unacceptable rapid decay in the power output of the
photovoltaic cells. This effect is naturally expected to be
worse for Option A-i, since the truss is shorter than that
for Option A-2.
Another unresolved problem is the prevention of micro-
meteoroid penetration. Similarly to both Option B and the
baseline station, neither Option A-1 nor A-2 provide
protection sufficient to meet the baselined safety
requirements. The redesign team estimate a 70 - 80 percent
likelihood of no penetration through the ten year lifetime.
This probability, they claim, can be improved up to about 90
percent through the results of studies currently in progress
for the baseline station. This is still a far cry, however,
from the 99.55 percent probability of no penetration that is
baselined.
Option A does fail to meet the specifications of the
redesign in other areas as well. Most importantly, the
number of payload racks available in this option is only
nine, four less than what was specified. This is caused by
the one third reduction in the volume of the modules that
results from the use of core modules. The redesign team
claimed to have accommodated the reduced volume by design
simplifications, but, in reality, it appears that it was
accommodated by reduced performance. A much less
significant failure of this option is its inability to
launch the Remote Manipulator System before HTC for Option
A-i. This failure is not serious, as it is launched on the
very next flight.
Evaluation
Of the three options, Option A provides the best
balance between simplification and maximum use of the
baseline station hardware. It is significantly cheaper than
the baseline and has relatively low programmatic risk
associated with it, as nearly all the hardware is identical
or nearly so to that of the baseline system. The
simplifications that were incorporated into this option
primarily eliminate redundancy. These advantages, coupled
with its political feasibility, make it the best of the
three options that were produced by the Redesign Team for
the current situation.
Option C
The last option under consideration was Option C.
Option C represents a completely different approach to the
development of a space station. Unlike the previous two
designs, which were constructed with only minor changes from
the Freedom baseline, Option C is derived from the Shuttle
orbiter systems and infrastructure. The resultant design,
while utilizing many of the same assemblies as the other two
options, is markedly different from the baseline station. A
sketch of the Option C configuration with the International
Modules deployed is shown in Figure 3.
Both Options A and B were based on a modular approach
to station assembly. A central truss is assembled, and
various modules are attached to that truss and to each
other. Option C consists primarily of a single pressurized
module that replaces the body of the Shuttle in the launch
assembly. This concept was suggested by the previous NASA
research for the Shuttle C program, in which a stripped-down
Space Shuttle was proposed as a heavy-lift launch vehicle.
In light of the radically different nature of this
design and its consequent immaturity, it was clearly a
concern to maximize the use of previously developed hardware
and software in order to decrease the programmatic risk of
the redesign. These systems could come from two sources,
either the previous Freedom design or the Shuttle systems
themselves. One goal in the development of this option was,
therefore, to minimize the development of new hardware,
especially in the engine and launch systems, where such
alterations are most expensive.
Another important issue was the maintenance of the
interfaces with the international modules. In the other two
options, because only minor revisions were being made to the
Figure 3. Option C - Permanent Human Capabilicy-
baseline design, it was clear that the agreements with the
Internationals could be maintained, but this was not obvious
for Option C. This requirement was especially constraining.
The strength of the Option C concept :was the volume it
provided; it was, however, more limited in surface area,
which is what the International Modules required, than the
other two options. -Maintaining these modules as external
was a major disadvantage, in that they were somewhat cramped
in terms of external area and in that the full internal
capacity was not being utilized.
This concern was made more pressing in light of the
adamant distaste the Internationals exhibited, primarily for
poii-ical reasons, toward Option C throughout the redesign
effort." The redesign did not entirely succeed in this
arena; the final design for this option would require
extensive reexamination and redesign by the International
Partners.
Description
The main body of the station, called the Core Module,
consists of a pressurized aluminum cylinder approximately 64
ft long with a 22 ft diameter. This cylinder is formed from
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seven smaller cylinders joined between by rings. This
structure provides sufficient volume for 75 International
Standard Payload Racks as well as a space for the crew
similar to that of the baseline Habitation Module. In fact,
Option C can support a crew of six for short periods of time
(about a week), an ability that might prove valuable in the
event of a Shuttle failure after docking.
At each end of the cylinder a docking facility is
attached, allowing for simultaneous access to two orbiters.
In addition to the two primary docking assemblies, several
berthing ports lie along the core module. The design
includes provision for two ACRVs (Soyuz modules) and five
berthing ports for the International Modules and the
pressurized logistics module. The entire station, including
the docking ports, is 92 ft long.
Power is provided by four "fixed," or non-rotating,
solar arrays, identical to the assemblies provided in the
Freedom baseline. The deletion of both the alpha and beta
joints simplifies the power system design dramatically.
Thermal rejection is accomplished through a combination of
body-mounted and deployable radiators.
Attitude is controlled by a two-fault tolerant GNC
system. Attitude is determined primarily through three
Global Positioning System links, from which position,
velocity, and attitude can be determined. The attitude is
controlled by four control moment gyroscopes (with only
three active at any given time). Attitude control maneuvers
are performed through reaction control thrusters identical
to those currently used on the Space Shuttle. The fourth
gyroscope provides one backup, and the primary reboost
propulsion system can also be used for attitude alteration.
Reboost is accomplished through six primary thrusters,
also identical to those used on Shuttle. The station
utilizes a bipropellant system, with monomethylhydrazine
(MMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) . The propellant is
stored in a total of ten tanks, five for fuel and five for
oxidizer. These tanks are identical to those under
development for the baseline station. Approximately 6000 lb
of fuel will be used each year for reboost and orbital
maneuvers. Since it is estimated that only 3500 lb can be
transferred to the station in one rendezvous, the station
must be resupplied at least twice a year. This limitation
can be weakened somewhat if the orbiter (with appropriate
modifications) transfers any excess propellant to the
Station propulsion system.
Prior to launch, one end of the station is covered by a
Shuttle-style nose cone. The other end is attached via a
transition section to a modified Shuttle aft fuselage, which
contains the main engine and the avionics. The
modifications to the aft fuselage are minor, consisting of
removal of the tail fins, the Shuttle orbital maneuvering
system, and the active body flap. These deletions can be
made because the station is not intended for reentry. It is
in the transition structure that most of the design work was
required.
The Core Module is attached to the External Tank in a
fashion similar to that used for the Shuttle. The solar
arrays are originally rolled up and covered by a shroud.
The launch sequence is similar to that of the Shuttle.
After external tank separation, the nose cone and shroud are
jettisoned. The engines are fired to circularize the orbit.
Finally, the solar arrays are deployed, and the station
becomes active. The station is launched unmanned and only
partial outfitted. The crew, the International Modules, and
some of the payload racks are brought up on subsequent
flights.
Issues
The most important outstanding issue for the Option C
design is electrical power. As was previously mentioned,
the four solar arrays are fixed and are therefore incapable
of adjusting to varying sun angles. The decision to
eliminate the alpha and beta joints was mandated by the
interference with the JEM and the self-shadowing which
result from rotating arrays. These issues are avoided in
the other designs because the arrays are deployed much
farther apart, separated from each other and the modules by
the length of the truss. The minimum power provided to the
users in Option C when the station is flying in the
preferred LVLH mode is only 18 kW, much less than the
specified 30 kW.
One remedy for this problem, which was proposed by the
Redesign Team, is to vary the flight mode of the station.
If the station is flown in solar inertial mode, in which the
station is maintained at a constant attitude with respect to
the sun, the cosine losses that the arrays were subject to
disappear, and power production increases drastically. This
flight mode is, however, unsuitable for earth or space
viewing activities. A complicated orbital profile is
therefore required, in which the station alternated between
LVLH and solar inertial mode in order to try to provide
enough power and time for all the scientific activities.
Even this does not wholly remedy the situation. There
is some concern that the rotation of the local gravity
vector caused by these flight mode variations will be
sufficient to negate the value of some microgravity
experiments. There were some proposals near the end of the
redesign process (about mid-May) of launching an additional
solar array on a tube that would be attached to the station
on a subsequent flight. The addition of this extra array,
while possibly simplifying the time-sharing schedule, would
not provide power sufficient to fly only in LVLH mode. This
issue remains unresolved.
Another concern that faced the Redesign Team was the
mass budget for Option C. The modified STS system described
above has the capability to launch approximately 190000 lb
to a standard orbit at 28.8 degrees. The estimated mass of
the station, with a ten percent margin, is a little above
that limit." The report emphasizes that chere are many
steps which can be taken to transfer mass to subsequent
flights, e.g. offload payload racks or other non-critical
equipment or optimizing the flight profile, but, with every
additional outfitting flight required, the advantage of a
"single-launch" space station decreases. In addition, a ten
percent mass margin is not very large, particularly for an
immature design where major structural components, such as
the transition section, are yet to be designed.
Related to the mass problem is the question of orbital
inclination. The higher inclination orbit is desirable for
all the reasons described in preceding chapters, but it does
exacerbate the mass problem. Even with the Al-Li tank, the
launch system can deliver only 178000 lb to a 51.6 degree
inclination orbit. In addition, the higher inclination
orbit drastically decreases the launch window from Kennedy
Space Center, from 55 min for a 28.8 degree orbit to only 5
min at 51.6 degrees. Given NASA's succession of delayed
launches in recent years, the increased risk for
operational, logistic, and personnel transfer flights is
obvious.
This is somewhat surprising considering the liftoff capacity of the launch vehicle. It seems possible that
the Option C team was being excessively conservative.
As was alluded to above, this option also requires
reexamination of the interfaces with the International
Modules. In addition to the failure to meet required power
levels, there are also significant viewing obstructions,
both from the solar arrays and the core module itself.
These problems are only made more complicated when the
station is flying in solar inertial mode instead of LVLH.
Other regions where redesign is required of the
International Partners to interface properly with this
design are in the fluid and electrical connections, which
are accomplished internally rather than externally, as in
the baseline station, and in the DMS, which is based on the
Shuttle system rather than that of the baseline.
Evaluation
Option C does have a number of advantages over the
other options. First and foremost, it decreases the number
of launches required for PHC from over twenty to a mere
handful. While the launch costs for the station were not
included in the costing analysis associated with redesign,
the benefits from the decrease in assembly flights would
likely outweigh the estimated one billion dollar cost of
modifying Shuttle hardware for Space Station use. This
occurs concurrently with a significant increase in volume
available to payload.
Perhaps even more important than the decrease in launch
costs is the feasibility of complete integrated testing on
the ground. This is contrasted with the assembly approach
of the other two options, in which extensive on-orbit
assembly is required, and ground testing is limited to the
modules, rather than the complete system. Again, given
NASA's predilection in recent years for expensive blunders,
this advantage cannot be emphasized too greatly.
Another important advantage of Option C is that it is
the safest of the options. This results partially from the
added confidence which complete ground testing can provide,
but there are other reasons as well. One reason is the
simplicity of the structure. Another important point is
that Option C does meet the requirement of .995 probability
of no penetration of the hull by micrometeoroids or space
debris over the ten year lifetime that was baselined.
Option C is the only design that has met this requirement.
In addition, the necessary amount of EVA activity is cut
dramatically. Finally, it decreases the risk of a launch
delaying assembly, although at the expense of increasing the
cost of a single failure. On the whole, these features tend
to make Option C safer than the other two designs.
Option C has one final advantage. According to the
cost estimates of the Redesign Committee, it is the cheapest
of the options. It was estimated that Option C would cost
about 15 billion dollars through PHC, 2 two billion less
than Option A, the next cheapest. While the validity of any
estimate for such an immature design is questionable, and
the costing process itself has been called biased by some,
the launch savings were not included in this analysis.
These effects will likely cancel out.
There are, however, a number of drawbacks to this
design. Many of the problems were discussed in the
preceding section: the insufficient power production, the
short launch window at high inclination, and the mass budget
overruns. There are also other areas in which the
assumptions made by the Redesign Team are questionable. The
figures for power production are based on the assumption
that improved transmission efficiency over that of the
baseline is possible because of shorter distance over which
the power must be transferred, but this claim has not been
substantiated.
More importantly, the cost savings quoted above arise
primarily due to the frequent use of Shuttle and baseline
Freedom hardware with only "minor" changes. As the design
is immature, it is not impossible that these "minor" changes
turn out to be more expensive that originally thought, or
even impractical.
Another less technical but equally important drawback
is the dislike the International Partners have expressed
toward it. This distaste arises, in part, from resentment
over having a redesign in the first place and, also, in
part, from the recognition that any changes are likely to
cost them money in redesigns, but their dislike for Option C
goes beyond this. This design provides so much volume that
the International Modules are largely extraneous. This
causes the Internationals to appear as unnecessary guests on
a predominantly U.S. project, and the quite rightly, from
their point of view, resent this.
All of these problems are in some way symptomatic of a
deeper flaw in Option C. The single launch conception,
while capable of providing a station that meets the
specifications in an efficient and even elegant fashion, is
less suitable as a redesign than the other two options. The
Redesign Committee, in an attempt to maximize the use of
baseline Freedom designs and hardware, tried to impose the
same modular approach on Option C. The use of extra
laboratory or logistic modules simply does not make sense in
this design, and this unsuitability of course shows up in
fundamental flaws in the final design. Option C is an
interesting and exciting alternative to the conception
entailed in the baseline and is very likely the approach
that should have been taken from the beginning, but is not
appropriate as a redesign in the current situation.
Summary
The Option C would have been preferable had it been
adopted from the onset of the Space Station Program. It is
a much simpler and more elegant conception of the space
station, decreasing the number of launches, the amount of
EVA, the cost required for assembly. The mass limitations
are minimal, and the power limitations could almost
certainly have been overcome with a properly optimized time-
sharing schedule for the experiments. The additional value
and improved reliability would have made it vastly superior
to the baseline station.
As a redesign, however, it less reasonable. It does
not take full advantage of the development that has already
been accomplished, and it would antagonize the International
Partners unnecessarily. Finally, it does not showcase the
exciting and daring technology which NASA so loves to
display. Option C is an extremely clever idea that was
thought of far too late.
Aftermath
The redesign effort produced three designs that were,
if of varying maturity and suitability, all at least viable.
The Blue Ribbon Panel then made its recommendations to the
administration, and one design was chosen and presented to
Congress. The space station design, however, has gone
through a number of incarnations since that point, largely
due to increasing interest in Russian participation. The
alterations to the station design made to accommodate the
Russians have been motivated primarily by political
considerations, with little or no effort to determine
whether they are appropriate or even reasonable technically.
The Blue Ribbon Panel
Many of the points pertaining to the individual options
that the Blue Ribbon Panel raised in their report to the
President have been considered in previous chapters; this
section will therefore be confined to discussing the
motivations for the recommendations that were made to the
President.
The first point made in the report is that the Power
Station should not be considered, for either Option A or B,
as a viable space station. The Power Station concept was
developed in an attempt to meet the 5-9 billion dollar cost
requirement that the administration had set at the onset of
the redesign effort. When it became obvious that it would
be impossible to meet this requirement and still maintain
permanent human capability, the Redesign Committee
introduced the Power Station as an option that would enable
some scientific research within the cost limitations.
The Blue Ribbon Panel in their report points out that
the length of experiments on a Power Station would be
limited by the time that the orbiter could remain on orbit.
This limits the experiments to under 30 day duration. The
Panel rightly argues that, as this limitation eliminates the
most useful experiments, the research capacity of a Power
Station configuration does not justify the developmental
costs. This recommendation indicates a recognition that the
cost targets that the Redesign Committee were set were
unreasonable.
The Blue Ribbon Panel went on to indicate that it
considered Option A to be superior to Option B. Option B
carries much higher risk, due to greater EVA requirements, a
larger number of assembly flights, and greater complexity.
The greater cost and late completion date were also factors
in this decision. Of the modular design concepts, Option A
was considered preferable.
In the evaluation of Options A and C, it was unclear
which one was superior. Option A, the report concludes, is
superior to Option C in technical and international
capability, largely due to the power limitations on Option C
(although, as has been discussed above, these limitations
might be eliminated through proper time management). It
also achieves a somewhat earlier initial utilization,
although at the expense of a later completion, than does
Option C.
Option C, on the other hand, has lower development and
launch risk, due to decreased EVA time and the possibility
of complete on-ground testing before launch. It is also the
cheapest of the options presented to the Blue Ribbon Panel
by the Redesign Committee. The Panel concluded by avoiding
the decision; it recommended both options to the
administration for further consideration.
The administration selected Option A, and, after a
difficult political struggle, the Congress accepted and
funded it (at least, temporarily). It seems likely that
political feasibility and popular opinion influenced the
administration's decision as much as any technical issues;
they were caught between the necessity of producing a
"different" space station for popular support and the
practical impossibility of convincing Congressmen whose
districts stood to benefit from the old design to accept a
completely new option. Option A was similar enough to the
baseline to keep key Congressmen placated, while different
enough (i.e. inexpensive enough) to be presented as a bold
redesign. For whatever reason, however, the choice of
Option A was appropriate, balancing the need for a change in
the Freedom program with the interest in maximizing return
from the money that was already invested.
The Blue Ribbon Panel also emphasized in their report
that, in order for any cost savings to be realized, some
sense of stability, in funding, design, and management, was
absolutely mandatory. How well this requirement is met will
likely determine the quality and utility of the space
station finally produced.
Space Station Alpha
Toward the end of the redesign process, it became clear
that the Russian Space Agency was extremely interested in
joining the Space Station Freedom effort. Since then it has
also become clear that the Clinton administration is just as
interested in involving the Russians, in order to, among
other things, provide another channel for financial aid to
the struggling Russian economy. As no firm commitment was
made before the end of the redesign effort and given the
interest on both sides, it was only a matter of time before
another redesign would be required to provide for Russian
involvement.
The Redesign Team did assume a certain amount of
Russian participation. The ACRVs were almost from the
beginning assumed to be the Soyuz vehicle, and one of the
chief advantages of the higher inclination orbits was the
possibility that Russian launch vehicles could reach it.
The redesign effort did not, however, examine the
repercussions of Russian involvement comparable to that of
the other international players. As a result, the systems
engineering required for sensible use of Russian
capabilities went largely undone.
Space Station Alpha represents a massive shift of
policy from that which led to the redesign effort in the
first place. The portion of this new design provided by the
United States is far closer to the Freedom baseline than to
the designs presented by the Redesign Committee. Added to
this fully operational space station will be elements of the
Russian Mir-2 station. The resulting hybrid is being
presented as improved, providing greater capability for less
cost and risk.
There are two versions of Space Station Alpha that are
being discussed. The first is a revised version of Option
A-1, with both Bus-i and the Russian Salyut FGB being
considered as candidates for the "space tug" that would
provide the propulsion and GNC functions on the revised
space station. Salyut is superior to Bus-i for this
purpose, in that it has the capability of controlling the
station sufficiently and can be refueled on orbit, but, in
the case the Russian Space Agency is unable to fulfill their
obligations, the Bus-i would be a possible backup.
The station would be placed in a 51.6 degree
inclination orbit and will therefore require either the Al-
Li external tank or the ASRM for assembly. In virtually all
respects not related to propulsion or GNC, this version of
Station Alpha is identical to the baseline Freedom design,
although NASA is claiming some cost savings from "subsystem
simplifications,"1" most notably in the data management and
thermal subsystems.
The other version of Space Station Alpha utilizes
elements from the Russian Mir-2, the planned replacement for
the current Mir station, in addition to the space tug. In
both cases, NASA claims, the basic configuration for Space
Station Alpha remains unchanged. This new Space Station
will cost 19 billion dollars and will be complete by 2003.
In a report to John Gibbons, the Presidential Advisor for
Science and Technology, NASA claims that the Space Station
Alpha design both simplifies the design and "avoids costly
redesign. ,15
Evaluation
The proposed use of a "space tug" is an excellent idea.
The inclusion of the Salyut FGB solves most of the problems
inherent in Option A-1, as described above: the need for
costly redesign of Bus-i (which would make its extensive on-
orbit database irrelevant), the difficulty of refueling, and
the questions regarding its control moment capacity. If,
however, Salyut becomes unavailable, whether from political
or economic turmoil or any other reason, the Bus-i could be
used as a replacement. In an emergency, the original
Freedom baseline subsystems would also insure lower
programmatic risk. In all, the possibility of acquiring
Salyut for the space station makes the Freedom program, and
Option A-1, significantly more robust.
This, however, is virtually the only positive aspect of
the Space Station Alpha redesign. In many other respects,
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the claims made for it are woefully inaccurate. First, NASA
is claiming lower costs from the Freedom Baseline resulting
from Russian participation and the avoidance of redesign.
It is unclear, however, how the creation of a complete new
set of interfaces, both technical and managerial, can be
created without redesign. Integration with Russian elements
will be a significant problem, especially as the design will
not be finalized until it is already well into development.
In summary, it is difficult to believe any projected cost
savings claimed by NASA resulting from Space Station Alpha
when no one really knows exactly what Station Alpha is.
Another claim made for Space Station Alpha is that it
has a lower programmatic risk. This assertion is based on
the fact that the basic configuration is independent of what
form the Russian participation takes. The Station Alpha
conception, however, seems almost designed for schedule
slippage; NASA is already estimating that the Space Station
will not be complete until the year 2003, two years later
than original estimates for the Freedom Baseline. In
addition, as the form Russian participation will take will
not be finalized until well along into the design, it is not
unreasonable to expect an integrations nightmare. This will
only be made worse by the fact that, given the fact that
many parts of the baseline design are already at critical
design review, a great deal of manufacturing may well take
place before the design is finalized. All of this factors
indicate a much higher programmatic risk than is assumed.
In addition to the technical problems discussed above,
the Russian involvement leads to significant management and
contracting difficulties. These issues are, of course, more
prominent in the "unified" design, in which Mir-2 components
will replace some Freedom systems. It seems inevitable that
a parallel management structure will result, undoing all of
the improvement that resulted from the recommendations of
the Redesign Committee and the Blue Ribbon Panel. There
also remain significant questions regarding the role of NPO
Energia and how it will be worked into the already revised
contracting structure.
Summary
In conclusion, it appears more and more that NASA and
the administration have little or no idea of what exactly is
desired from a space station. What began as an attempt to
streamline the Freedom Program has developed into an ill-
defined design that will, in all likelihood, cost more and
take longer to produce. It is unclear that the inclusion of
the Russians in such a haphazard manner will provide any
additional functionality or cost reduction, while incurring
sizable programmatic risk. In short, Russian involvement
must be rethought and a design finalized before the
uncertainty and confusion destroys the Space Station
program.
Russian Involvement
With the design for the space station essentially
returning to the baseline, the only important products of
the redesign effort resulted from the addition of Russian
involvement. As the only design driver to actually result
in sizable changes from the baseline, one would hope that
Russian involvement was implemented rationally and
intelligently. Unfortunately, while some irmprovements did
arise from this, the full ramifications of Russian
involvement were not sufficiently considered.
There were two major Russian elements included in the
redesigned Space Station Alpha. The first of these was the
inclusion of the Soyuz capsule as an ACRV. The second was
the replacement of the baseline GNC and propulsion
subsystems with the Salyut FGB. These changes were well
thought out and carry little programmatic risk. Indeed, it
was widely accepted that Soyuz would be utilized as the ACRV
even before the redesign began.
From a political and philosophical perspective, the
inclusion of the Russians is a breakthrough. The symbolic
value of the U.S. and Russia cooperating in space, formerly
an arena for intense conflict, is obvious. In addition, it
is also a step toward actually implementing international
cooperation in space, a stated goal of the redesign effort.
Before the redesign effort, the U.S. had been adamant
in refusing to allow any other country in the critical
design path. The U.S. portion of the Space Station would be
complete in and of itself. The European partners and Japan
would contribute experimental modules, providing extra
laboratory volume, and Canada, a remote manipulator. But
the U.S. would also provide a laboratory module, and the
functions of the Canadian contribution could be met with the
Shuttle arm. In effect, the International "Partners" were
largely accessory to the program, not fully integrated into
the development process. This policy hardly seems to be
designed to promote international cooperation in space in
any meaningful way.
In the redesigned Station Alpha, the Russians are now
in the critical design path, supplying GNC and propulsion as
well as the ACRVs. Certainly the U.S. will consider the use
of Bus-i and additional Shuttles respectively in the case of
total collapse of the Russian space program, but finally an
international partner is involved in some critical part of
the design. In addition, the Russians will be counted upon
the provide additional station access capability (in the
event of a Shuttle failure), and there is still an argument
ongoing over the use of Russian launch vehicles for assembly
flights. All in all, the addition of the Russian elements
has been a step toward the international cooperation in
large space programs that more and more people consider
necessary, although at the expense of antagonizing the other
International Partners.
The conception of Russian involvement in the Space
Station Freedom program is flawed, not technically, but at a
programmatic level. The addition of the Russians offered an
opportunity for NASA to reduce the cost of the space station
significantly. These possibilities went largely unrealized
due to the redesign team's focus on purely technical issues
and its inability or refusal to attack the specifications
that they were given.
The research planned for the space station can be
divided into microgravity and life science experiments. The
life science experiments are extensions of the work that had
been done previously by the Russians on the Mir station.
Space Station Freedom's life science capabilities have
received some criticism, primarily from Russian cosmonauts,
saying that no new experiments will be accomplished.
Regardless of how complete you consider the Russian
life science experiments, it is certainly true that Mir was
designed primarily with the life sciences in mind. The
recent agreement with Russia allowing U.S. astronauts to
utilize Mir raises the possibility of using Mir for some of
the life science experiments envisioned for Space Station
Freedom. While Mir's technical capabilities are inferior to
the proposed station, it could certainly be used to
supplement Freedom and alleviate scheduling problems in the
event of a conflict. In addition, it would possibly provide
convenient storage for some spare equipment.
It is anticipated that Mir, although not as well
maintained in recent years as before the breakup of the
Soviet Union, still has several years of use left in it.
The current plan for American utilization of Mir facilities
provides for experiments upon Mir up until Space Station
Freedom is operational. As it seems increasingly likely
that there will be some schedule slippage in the Freedom
program, this will provide a database of up to six years,
easily large enough for the experiments currently
envisioned. The resulting database might even be more
valuable, as it would not be interrupted by the microgravity
experiments under some time-sharing program. This would
allow the Space Station to be designed as primarily a
platform for microgravity experiments, with life science
information being an added benefit, but of secondary
importance.
An important result of such a change would be the focus
that it would bring to the design. The Space Station has
been haunted throughout all of its incarnations by a lack of
quantifiable and justifiable specifications. Such a drastic
change in the purpose of the Space Station would allow for
well-defined and well understood specifications. This, in
turn, would lead to a more intelligent design that would be
much cheaper to assemble and operate and would have a much
lower programmatic risk.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to return to the four
programmatic objectives discussed in my introduction, which,
I believe, are largely unfulfilled by the current program.
The first of these was to "perform significant long-duration
space research in materials and life sciences." The current
design, Space Station Alpha, will have significant capacity
for such research. The question that has not been addressed
by the redesign is whether the space station needs to be
able to carry out all of the promised experiments at once.
If the timesharing issue is not addressed fairly early in
the design process, the resulting Space Station will either
be unable to carry on all of the planned experiments or will
not be utilized to its fullest capacity.
The second object was to promote international
cooperation in space science and technology. The previous
chapter discussed the benefits in this area which result
from the inclusion of Russia in the Freedom program. This
is a sizable step in the right direction. The Redesign
Effort has not, however, been without setbacks in the area
of international relations. The initial International
Partners were united in expressing their discontent over
another in a long series of redesigns by the U.S. Every
time the Space Station is redesigned, they are forced to
spend additional money to adapt to it. Perhaps justly, they
consider this redesign as a sign of a lack of respect and
consideration on the part of the U.S. toward their space
programs.
The third object of the Redesign Effort was to
encourage industry to invest in space science experiments.
While the Redesign Team did put some effort into
understanding the interface with users, it is hard to
believe that industries, which have been notoriously
conservative in their investments in space science, will be
-motivated to invest in a program which has been burdened by
so many problems and - ich, even ten months after the
redesign began, has little design stability. If the Space
Station produces valuable scientific results, this attitude
may change, but progress in this area will certainly be
gradual.
The final avowed objective of the Freedom program was
to determine the feasibility of continuing manned space
exploration. The jury is still out on this issue and will
remain so until the Station is actually operational. The
only point that can be made at this stage is that the more
time that is spent in redesign, the longer it will be before
any such information will be available.
It seems clear that the Space Station that has emerged
from the Redesign Effort does not directly address the
issues that it is purported to target. The source of this
problem was a lack of understanding of the specifications
for the Space Station. Instead of seeking to understand the
motivations for the numbers (lifetime, power requirements,
etc.), the redesign team blindly accepted them, perhaps
because the motivations for these numbers have been lost
since the early stages of the Freedom program.
For whatever reason, the Redesign Team was content to
design to the numbers that they were given, and, as a
result, they made what amount only to purely cosmetic
changes in the design, when changes on a much deeper level
were necessary to retarget the goals which were claimed for
the Space Station.
The development of the Space Station has now been
halted for almost a year with little fundamental change in
the design to show for it. The design is only now beginning
to stabilize. Critical elements have been replaced with
Russian equipment. The simplifications that the Redesign
Team made in the management and contracting structures will
be complicated by dealing with the Russian Space Agency and
NPO Energia. Every day spent, along with the time spent in
transition between designs, in further redesign will
increase the cost of the program. Despite the time and
money spent in redesign, NASA persists in claiming for the
new Space Station Alpha sizable cost reductions and an
earlier date for full operational capability. It seems
certain at this point that some sort of space station will
be built, one that, in all likelihood will meet the numbers
which were specified in the Redesign, but in light of such
claims, it is difficult to place any confidence in NASA's
cost and schedule estimates for the station, its scientific
value, or NASA itself.
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